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Case No. 20110174-SC 
INTHE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff / Petitioner, 
vs. 
Patrick Robert Ramirez, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Brief of Petitioner State of Utah 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The magistrate found insufficient evidence to bind Ramirez over for trial on 
one count of possession or use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and 
one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, and 
dismissed the charges. The State appealed the dismissal to the court of appeals, 
which affirmed the magistrate's ruling. This Court granted the State's timely 
petition for a writ of certiorari. This Court has jurisdiction under its certiorari 
review authority. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) & (5) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The Court granted certiorari review on the following question: 
"Whether the majority of the panel of the court of appeals erred in affirming 
the magistrate's refusal to bind Defendant over." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' 
decision for correctness and affords no deference to the court of appeals' legal 
conclusions. In re A.T., 2001 UT 82, | 5, 34 P.3d 228. When reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence at a preliminary hearing, the appellate court, like the 
magistrate, must view the "evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution 
and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." State v. Clark, 
2001 UT 9,110,20 P.3d 300 (citation omitted). A magistrate's bindover decision is 
afforded only "limited deference." State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, | 26,137 P.3d 787. 
Whether probable cause exists is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See 
State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, f 14 n.2,48 P.3d 872. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum D: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2009); 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-2 (West Supp. 2009); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West Supp. 2009); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-3 (West Supp. 2009). .
 { 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ramirez was charged with one count of third-degree felony possession or use 
of a controlled substance, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2009), 
and one count of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, see Utah Code 
2 
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Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West Supp. 2009). Rl-2. After a preliminary hearing, the 
magistrate refused to find probable cause to support the information and dismissed 
both charges. R36-37. The State timely appealed to the court of appeals. R42-43. 
Judge Orme, writing for the majority, affirmed the magistrate's dismissal Judge 
Thorne dissented. The court of appeals' decision is reproduced in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On 6 May 2009, Ramirez was in the Washington County Jail on drug-related 
charges. R41:5. That day, a jailor overhead Ramirez ask a woman on the telephone 
to go to his motel room,"retrieve a glass pipe before the manager could find it," and 
take the pipe to police. R41:5-8. Ramirez told the woman that the pipe was clean 
and "would clear his name" of his pending drug charges. R41:8. The jailor 
arranged for Ramirez to talk on the telephone with a member of the Washington 
County Drug Task Force. R41:ll. Ramirez invited the task force to search for the 
1
 Consistent with the standard of review for a magistrate's bindover decision, 
the following facts are stated "in the light most favorable to the prosecution," and 
all "reasonable inferences" are drawn in favor of the prosecution. See State v. Clark, 
2001UT9,1J10,120P.3d300. 
3 
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unused pipe in his motel room, reiterating that the pipe would "clear his name" of 
the pending charges.2 R41:12-13,15. 
Ramirez stayed on the phone with the officers while they entered the room 
with the manager and searched for the pipe. R41:13. The officers found a clear glass 
pipe where Ramirez said it would be—on his bed under some covers. Id. The pipe 
was "the type commonly used to ingest controlled substances," and "did not appear 
to be used." Id. 
Over the phone, an officer asked Ramirez "why he had the unused pipe in the 
first place." R41:16. Ramirez replied, "I'm going to be honest with you,.. . I have a 
problem." Id. Ramirez added that he had a clean, unused syringe on him when 
arrested, because he liked to "ram" or "slam"—meaning inject—his drugs. Id. 
When officers asked if they could search the rest of Ramirez's room, he said, 
"Yeah, go ahead. There won't be anything there." R41:14. But inside a trash bag 
hanging in the kitchen, officers found the corner of a baggie and a short piece of 
plastic or "tube" straw. Both the baggie and straw had methamphetamine residue 
on them. R41:14,16-20. 
2
 The record is not illuminating as to why Ramirez thought finding a clean 
glass pipe in his living quarters would exonerate him of pending drug charges. See 
R41:15. 
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No evidence suggested that anyone other than Ramirez occupied the motel 
room. R41:20-23. The officers found paperwork and a prescription bottle with 
Ramirez's name on it. R41:20, 23. They found nothing in the room identified as 
belonging to anyone else. R41:23. On cross-examination, an officer acknowledged 
that the manager, who had let them in, could have had prior access to the room. In 
response to questioning, the officer also "imagined" that the housekeeping staff also 
could have had prior access to the room. R41:22-23. 
Magistrate's Ruling 
The magistrate refused to bind Ramirez over on both counts. R36-37. The 
magistrate found probable cause "to believe that Defendant had dominion and 
control over the motel room at some point in time before the officers searched the 
room," but opined that no evidence showed that Ramirez "had knowledge that the 
drug residue and paraphernalia [found in the trash] were present in the motel room 
either when he was personally present in the room or when the officers searched the 
room." R37. The magistrate further concluded that "[ejvery reasonable inference 
from the evidence/' was that Ramirez "did not know of the presence of the drug 
residue and paraphernalia." Id. (emphasis by magistrate). The magistrate reasoned 
that "[w]ithout knowledge of the presence of the contraband," he "could not infer 
that Defendant intended to exercise control over the contraband," and that 
5 
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"[w]ithout evidence of an intent to exercise control, there can be no inference of < 
possession of drug residue or paraphernalia/' Id. 
The magistrate based his decision, at least in part, on an inference that if 
Ramirez had known of the drug residue and paraphernalia in the trash, he never 
would have invited police to search his room. For example, at the end of the 
i 
preliminary hearing, the magistrate said: "it's a stronger inference [Ramirez] didn't 
know the drugs were there, or he wouldn't have sent police officers to that place to 
look around." R41:34. In his findings, the magistrate added: "I am well-acquainted 
with this Defendant, having recently sentenced him to multiple terms of 
incarceration in the Utah State Prison. He purports to be familiar with police 4 
investigations and with his rights in those investigations." R37 n.l. 
Court of Appeals" Decision 
In tne cou.rt of appeals, the State argued that the preliminary hearing evidence 
and its reasonable inferences supported probable cause—i.e., a reasonable 
i 
belief—that the contraband found in the trash belonged to Ramirez, particularly 
where he admitted to abusing drugs and possessing drug paraphernalia, and where, 
by all indications, he lived alone in the motel room. See State's Opening Br. in Ct. 
Apps. at 12-17. The State argued that to the extent one could reasonably infer from 
the evidence that the manager or housekeeper might have entered the room and < 
6 
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planted the contraband in the trash bag, the far more reasonable inference from the 
evidence was that the contraband belonged to Ramirez. See id. at 16-17. The State 
contended that under this Court's precedent, the magistrate was required to accept 
the latter reasonable inference over all others and bind Ramirez over, so that the 
trier of fact could decide which inference was more reasonable. See id. at 10-12,17. 
The majority opinion. Writing for the majority, Judge Orme disagreed that 
the evidence supported any reasonable inference that the contraband belonged to 
Ramirez. Ramirez, 2010 UT App 373U, at *1. According to the majority, the "critical 
piece missing from the State's presentation was evidence showing the nature and 
character of the motel, or of Defendant's room in particular, and the exclusivity of 
his control and access." Id. The majority faulted the prosecution for not calling the 
manager to testify, adding: "Without such evidence in the record, the State's 
contentions about the exclusivity of Defendant's control of and access to the room, 
at all points in time when the contraband might have found its way into the garbage 
sack, are speculations — albeit plausible ones —rather than inferences logically 
drawn from the evidence actually before the magistrate." Id. 
The dissent In Judge Thome's view, the preliminary hearing evidence gave 
rise to two alternative, but conflicting, reasonable inferences. First, because Ramirez 
"gave permission to search the motel room, which others such as the manager and 
7 
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housekeeping staff may have had access/' one could reasonably infer that Ramirez < 
/'did not know of the presence of the drug residue and paraphernalia." Id. at *2 
(Thorne, J., dissenting). But other facts at preliminary hearing gave rise to "an 
alternative reasonable inference": that Ramirez "indeed knew of the drug residue 
but thought that the residue would not be discovered because he had properly 
discarded it prior to leaving his room.7' Id. Relying on this Court's precedent, Judge 
Thorne concluded that the conflicting inferences were required to be resolved in 
favor of the prosecution. Id. at *2-3 (citing Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ 10). Under that * 
precedent, Judge Thorne explained, the bindover standard is "relatively low" and 
"intended to leave the principal fact finding of the issues . . . to the jury." Id. at *2. | 
Judge Thorne also disagreed with the majority that "the absence of exclusivity 
evidence renders any other inferences speculative." Id. Rather, Judge Thorne 
explained, the preliminary hearing evidence provided " a logical basis from which to 
deduce that Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled 
i 
substance and drug paraphernalia." Id. at *3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals' majority concluded that the preliminary hearing * 
evidence failed to support a reasonable inference that the contraband found in the 
trash sack belonged to Ramirez, because another alternative reasonable inference | 
8 
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suggested that someone other than Ramirez had access to his motel room. By 
requiring the prosecution to exclude all alternative reasonable explanations or 
hypotheses, the court of appeals effectively replaced the relatively low probable 
cause standard required at preliminary hearing with the much higher beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard required at trial. It also effectively eviscerated the 
requirement that the magistrate resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the 
prosecution. 
At the preliminary hearing stage, however, the prosecution need not preclude 
all reasonable alternative explanations or hypotheses. The prosecution need only 
adduce sufficient evidence that supports a reasonable belief that the defendant 
committed the charged offense. In assessing whether the evidence supports such a 
belief, the magistrate and reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
prosecution. When faced with competing reasonable inferences, the magistrate 
must choose those inferences that reasonably support the prosecution's case. The 
task of resolving those conflicts is left to the ultimate trier of fact. 
Here, the preliminary hearing evidence supported a reasonable inference that 
the contraband found in Ramirez's motel room belonged to him: Ramirez admitted 
to being a drug abuser and to possessing paraphernalia for that purpose—the needle 
9 
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he possessed when arrested and the glass pipe found in his bed. The clean glass < 
pipe found in his bed—where he said it would be—was of the type commonly used 
to ingest drugs. Methamphetamine residue was found on a baggie and short tube 
straw in a trash bag hanging in the motel room that by all indications only he 
occupied. And although the manager and housekeeping may have had access to the 
i 
room during his absence, that did not negate the reasonable inference that the 
contraband in Ramirez's trash sack belonged to him. Presumably, if housekeeping 
or the manager had entered the room, the trash sack would have been removed. 
In sum, to the extent that one can infer from the evidence that someone else 
might have entered the room and planted the contraband in the trash sack, the far 4 
more reasonable inference from the evidence is that the contraband belonged to 
Ramirez, who admitted to abusing drugs and possessing drug paraphernalia, and 
who, by all indications, lived alone in the motel room. The magistrate and court of 
appeals' majority were required to accept the latter inference. The court of appeals' 
i 
majority therefore erred in not binding Ramirez over on both charges. 
10 
I 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' MAJORITY ERRED WHEN IT 
AFFIRMED THE MAGISTRATE'S REFUSAL TO BIND OVER 
The court of appeals' majority concluded that the preliminary hearing 
evidence was not susceptible to any reasonable inference that the contraband found 
in the trash bag belonged to Ramirez. The majority based this conclusion on the 
State's failure to produce evidence "showing the nature and character of the motel, 
or of [Ramirez's] room in particular, and the exclusivity of his control and access." 
State v. Ramirez, 2010 UT App 373U, at *1. The majority reasoned that without 
"such evidence," the State could not show that Ramirez had exclusive control of and 
access to his motel room "at all points in time when the contraband might have 
found its way into the garbage sack." Id. Thus, the majority concluded, the State's 
contention that the evidence supported an inference that Ramirez knew that the 
contraband was in his room was mere "speculation," albeit "plausible." Id. 
As explained below, the majority's reasoning mistakenly presupposes that the 
State is required at the preliminary hearing stage to exclude all reasonable 
alternative explanations or hypotheses of a defendant's innocence. As a result, the 
majority's opinion effectively increases the relatively low probable-cause standard 
of proof required for bindover to the much higher beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
11 
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< 
standard of proof required for a guilty verdict. It also effectively eviscerates well-
established precedent requiring a magistrate to resolve all conflicting evidence and 
inferences in favor of the prosecution. Id. at*l. 
Because the majority misapplies the preliminary hearing standards, it also 
mistakenly concludes that the evidence did not support a reasonable inference that 
the contraband found in the trash bag belonged to Ramirez. As explained more 
fully below, the preliminary hearing evidence supports such an inference. And, as 
Judge Thorne wrote, that reasonable inference was not negated by any lack of 
evidence on "the nature and character" of the motel and Ramirez's room or on the 
"exclusivity" of Ramirez's "control and access" to his room. 
A. The prosecution need not preclude all reasonable alternative 
explanations or inferences at the preliminary hearing stage. 
The threshold standard for obtaining a bindover is well-established: "To bind 
a defendant over for trial, the State must show 'probable cause' at a preliminary 
hearing by 'presenting] sufficient evidence to establish that the crime charged has 
been committed and that the defendant has committed it.'" State v. Clark, 2001UT 9, 
Tj 10,20 P.3d 300 (additional internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, 
"to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution must. .. produce believable 
12 
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evidence of all the elements of the crime charged/' Id. at f 15 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
But the quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause 
for a bindover is "relatively low" — the same as that for obtaining an arrest warrant. 
Id. at H 10,16. See also State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29,118,137 P.3d 787. Under both 
the bindover and arrest standards, the prosecution must only present "'sufficient 
evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that 
the defendant committed it/" Virgin* 2006 UT 29, f 20 (quoting Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 
16) (emphasis added). 
In assessing whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief that a 
defendant committed each element of the charged offense, the magistrate "must 
view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw 
all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 10 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). And, "when faced with conflicting 
evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence." Id. Rather, the 
magistrate "must leave those tasks to the fact finder at trial." Id. 
Likewise, when the evidence gives rise to competing reasonable inferences, 
the magistrate must choose those inferences that support the prosecution's case. See 
id. at f 20 (although preliminary hearing evidence gave rise to two alternative 
13 
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inferences—one suggesting innocence and the other guilt—viewing evidence in 
light most favorable to prosecution, evidence supported probable cause); see also 
State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, % 20, 26 P.3d 223 ("Although defendants' 
characterizations of the facts may also be plausibly inferred from the evidence there 
are clearly factual issues that must be resolved at trial, and the facts do not negate 
the reasonable inferences presented by the State"); State v. Jaeger, 896 P.2d 42,45-46 
(Utah App. 1995) (conflicts or //uncertainties,/ in preliminary hearing evidence 
should be "left for the fact-finder to resolve at trial"). 
The magistrate must choose the inferences that support the prosecution, even 
when the magistrate believes that the opposing inferences appear to be more likely. 
Cf. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f^f 20-21 (finding prosecution had shown probable cause 
despite identifying two plausible alternate inferences); Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, f 20 
(finding probable cause despite competing plausible inferences of innocence and 
guilt). So long as the inferences that support the prosecution's case are reasonable, 
the magistrate must bind over. 
The prosecution, therefore, is not required to exclude all reasonable 
alternative explanations or hypotheses of a defendant's innocence at the preliminary 
hearing stage. To the contrary, as explained, when the evidence is conflicting, the 
magistrate does not resolve those conflicts, but leaves that task to the fact-finder at 
14 
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trial As Judge Thorne recognized in his dissent: The "bindover standard is 
intended to leave the principal fact finding of the issues . . . to the jury/7 Ramirez, 
2010 UT App 373U, at *2 (Thorne, J., dissenting). 
The court of appeals' majority accurately recited the foregoing precedent. But 
it materially departed from it. First, the majority—like the magistrate— refused to 
draw those reasonable inferences in support of the prosecution's theory that the 
contraband belonged to Ramirez. This was based on the majority's—and 
magistrate's—misapprehension that the prosecution was required at the preliminary 
hearing stage to exclude all other reasonable alternative explanations of how the 
methamphetamine came to be in Ramirez's trash: "The critical piece missing from 
the State's presentation was evidence showing the nature and character of the motel, 
or of Defendant's room in particular, and the exclusivity of his control and access!' 
Ramirez, 2010 UT App 373U, at *1 (emphasis added). 
By requiring the prosecution at the preliminary hearing stage to exclude all 
possible explanations of Defendant's innocence, the majority in effect adopted the 
so-called reasonable alternative hypothesis standard, which is "a more specific 
statement of the traditional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt," 
required at trial. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 799 (Utah 1991). Thus, the court of 
appeals' majority effectively replaced the "relatively low" probable cause standard 
15 
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i 
heretofore required at preliminary hearing with the much higher beyond-a- < 
reasonable-doubt standard required at trial. And, in so doing, the majority 
effectively converted the magistrate's role as gatekeeper, see Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 12, 
into that of the ultimate trier of fact. 
In that regard, requiring the prosecution to exclude all reasonable 
i 
explanations of a defendant's innocence also directly conflicts with this Court's 
precedent, which not only prohibits a magistrate from resolving conflicting evidence 
against the prosecution, but requires a magistrate to bind over whenever any 
reasonable inference from the evidence supports a reasonable belief that the 
defendant committed the crime. 4 
B. The magistrate and the court of appeals' majority erred in not 
drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicting 
reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution. 
The majority opinion also directly conflicts with this Court's precedent 
requiring the magistrate to draw all reasonable inferences in support of the 
prosecution's case. The majority here not only refused to draw any reasonable 
inference that Ramirez possessed the methamphetamine residue found in the trash 
sack in a room that only he occupied, but it also drew only those inferences that * 
were adverse to the prosecution's case. 
i 
16 
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An inference is a "conclusion reached by considering other facts and 
deducing a logical consequence from them." Black's Law Dictionary 793 (8th ed. 
2004). Stated otherwise, an inference is "a deduction as to the existence of a fact 
which human experience teaches us can reasonably and logically be drawn from 
proof of other facts/' State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, f 16,3 P.3d 725. See also State 
v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1985) (inference is "logical and reasonable 
conclusion of the existence of a fact in a case, not presented by direct evidence as to 
the existence of the fact itself, but inferred from the establishment of other facts from 
which by a process of logic and reason, based upon common experience, the 
existence of the assumed fact may be concluded by the trier of fact"). Speculation, 
on the other hand, is "the act or practice of theorizing about matters over which 
there is no certain knowledge." Hester, 2000 UT App 159,<f16. 
Contrary to the majority's decision, the State's argument that the evidence 
supported a reasonable belief that the contraband belonged to Ramirez was not 
merely "plausible" speculation, but "a deduction as to the existence of a fact which 
human experience teaches us can reasonably and logically be drawn from proof" of 
those facts presented at the preliminary hearing. Ramirez, 2010 UT App 373U, at *2 
(Thorne, J., dissenting). 
17 
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The legal test for determining whether a defendant possesses drugs not found 
on his person is "whether there was a sufficient nexus between the defendant and 
the drugs or paraphernalia to permit a factual inference that the defendant had the 
power and the intent to exercise control over the drugs or paraphernalia/' State v. 
Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 15, 985 P.2d 911. Both the majority and the magistrate 
incorrectly assumed that a sufficient nexus could not be shown between Ramirez 
and the contraband so long as anyone else might have had access to the room where 
the contraband was found. See Ramirez, 2010 UT App 373U, at *2 (emphasizing 
prosecution's failure to adduce evidence "about the exclusivity of Defendant's 
control of and access to the room, at all points in time when the contraband might 
have found its way into the garbage sack"). 
But this Court has explained that the nexus inquiry is highly-f act intensive, 
and may include consideration of many different factors such as ownership and/or 
occupancy of the place where the contraband is found, previous drug use, 
incriminating statements or behavior, or the presence of drugs or paraphernalia in a 
specific area where the defendant had control. See Layman, 1999 UT 79,114; State v. 
Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1985); State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, \ 32,122 P.3d 
639. 
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The foregoing factors are neither exhaustive nor "legal elements of 
constructive possession in any context/' Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 14. Rather, they are 
merely helpful considerations in an appropriate fact pattern. See id. at | 15. 
Ultimately, the "final legal test is the most generally-worded one: ... whether there 
was a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the drugs or paraphernalia to 
permit a factual inference that the defendant had the power and the intent to 
exercise control over the drugs or paraphernalia." Layman, 1999 UT 79, *J 15. Thus, 
while exclusivity of control and access is certainly an important factor—and may 
even conclusively prove constructive possession—its lack does not by itself negate a 
factual inference that a defendant constructively possessed contraband. 
The preliminary hearing evidence here gave rise to a reasonable belief that 
defendant had a sufficient nexus to the contraband to permit such a factual 
inference. The uncontroverted evidence before the magistrate was that Ramirez, 
who was being held on other drug-related charges, asked the police to go to the 
motel room where he had been living to find a "clean glass pipe/' because Ramirez 
believed this would exonerate him. R41:8,12-13,15,24. There was no evidence that 
anyone but Ramirez lived in or exercised control over his motel room. See R41:20-
23. The fact that Ramirez initially called a friend to go to his room to get the pipe 
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"before the manager could find it" suggests that Ramirez lived alone in the room 
and believed that his possessions would still be as he had left them. R41:6. 
Officers found the pipe where Ramirez said it would be and in a place "in a 
specific area" over which he had "special control," Fox, 709 P.2d at 320: "on his bed 
under some covers." R41:13. The pipe was of "the type commonly used to ingest 
controlled substances," although it appeared to be unused. R41:13. 
Ramirez made incriminating statements to the police. See Fox, 709 P.2d at 320 
(discussing importance of "other incriminating evidence"). When asked why he 
had the unused pipe "in the first place," he admitted to being a drug user and to 
possessing a syringe, because he liked to "ram" or inject his drugs. R41:16. 
Ramirez gave the officers permission to search the rest of his room, claiming 
that they would not find anything. R41:14, 23. Yet, a thorough search yielded 
methamphetamine residue in a baggie and on a short tube straw in a trash bag 
hanging in the kitchen. R41:14,16-20. Again, the contraband was found in a place 
where only Ramirez lived and exercised control. R41:5-8, 20, 23. Significantly, it 
was found in a motel room where Ramirez kept a pipe of the type commonly used 
to ingest drugs. 
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Taken together, the foregoing evidence and its reasonable inferences support 
a reasonable belief that Ramirez owned, and therefore possessed, the drug residue 
and short tube straw. 
As Judge Thorne recognized, the fact that the manager and housekeeping 
might have had access to Ramirez's room does not negate those reasonable 
inferences. Rather, that fact at most gives rise to an alternative but conflicting 
inference, which, as explained, is for the jury to resolve. But while it is possible that 
the manager or housekeeper might have accessed Ramirez's room and deposited the 
contraband in the trash sack, the most reasonable inference from the evidence is that 
the contraband was Ramirez's. Presumably, if housekeeping had accessed the 
room, the trash sack would have been removed. Nothing in the evidence—or 
human experience—suggests a reason why someone other than Ramirez would have 
taken the trouble to deposit the contraband in a trash sack in a room occupied solely 
by Ramirez. 
The court of appeals' majority and the magistrate appear to have inferred that 
Ramirez did not know of the contraband's presence in his trash sack, because he 
consented to the search. R37 n.l; R41:34. That inference, however, is not a 
reasonable one. Criminal defendants regularly consent to searches, even though 
they know that contraband is present. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 2007 UT App 117, f 5, 
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158 P.3d 1134 (defendant consented to search of person, which yielded 
paraphernalia); State v. Perez-Llamas, 2006 UT App 428U (defendant consented to 
search of tires, which contained drugs); State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ 14-16, 63 
P.3d 650 (defendant consented to search of vehicle, which yielded marijuana pipe). 
And, as Judge Thorne recognized, a more reasonable inference is that Ramirez 
"indeed knew of the drug residue but thought that the residue would not be 
discovered because he had properly discarded it prior to leaving the room/7 See 
Ramirez, 2010 UT App 373U, *2 (Thorne, J., dissenting). 
In any event, the question here is not whether Ramirez knew the contraband 
would be discovered when he invited officers to search his room. The question is 
whether the evidence and its reasonable inferences support a reasonable belief that 
the contraband found in the trash belonged to Ramirez. As explained, the most 
reasonable inference from the evidence in this case is that the contraband belonged 
to the person with the strongest factual nexus to it—Ramirez. But even assuming 
that the evidence gives rise to a reasonable conflicting inference that someone else 
placed the contraband in Ramirez's trash, the magistrate was obligated to accept the 
inference supporting the prosecution's case and to bind Ramirez over. 
The court of appeals thus erred in affirming the magistrate's refusal to bind 
over. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the court of appeals' 
decision affirming the magistrate's refusal to bind Ramirez over for trial. 
Respectfully submitted September 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
">£<c*x 
J^AURA B. DUPAIX 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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STATE of Utah- Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Patrick Robert RAMIREZ, Defendant and Ap-
pellee. 
No. 20090912-CA. 
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Before Judges MCHUGH, ORME, and THORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
ORME, Judge: 
*1 "To bind a defendant over for trial, the State 
must show probable cause at a preliminary hearing 
by presenting] sufficient evidence to establish that 
the crime charged has been committed and that the 
defendant has committed it." State v. Clark, 2001 
UT 9, t 10, 20 P.3d 300 (alteration in original) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
While" the quantum of evidence required to support 
a finding of probable cause for bindover is 
"relatively low," id 1fl[ 10, 16, "to prevail at a pre-
liminary hearing, the prosecution must ... produce 
believable evidence of all the elements of the crime 
charged," id. \ 15 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). To determine whether the evidence 
supports a reasonable belief that the defendant com-
mitted each element of the charged offense, " 'the 
magistrate must view all evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reas-
onable inferences in favor of the prosecution.' " Id 
f 10 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
To bind over on possession of a controlled sub-
stance and possession of drug paraphernalia, the 
State must present evidence sufficient to support a 
reasonable belief that Defendant knowingly and in-
tentionally possessed a controlled substance and 
drug paraphernalia, respectively. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.2010) (possession of 
a controlled substance); id § 58-37a-5(l)-(2) 
(possession of drug paraphernalia). In this context, 
"possession" is defined as "the joint or individual 
ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, 
belonging, [or] maintaining" of contraband. Id § 
58-37-2(1)00-
In this case, the State failed to present suffi-
cient evidence "to support a reasonable belief that 
[Defendant] committed the charged crime," State v. 
Virgin, 2006 UT 29, f 17, 137 P.3d 787. Because 
Defendant was in jail at the time officers searched 
his motel room, the State, as the magistrate con-
cluded, "would have to establish probable cause to 
believe that Defendant had constructive possession 
of the contraband." Although the magistrate found 
"probable cause to believe that Defendant had 
dominion and control over the motel room at some 
point in time before the officers searched the 
room," he nevertheless concluded-and the emphasis 
is his, not ours-that "[e]very reasonable inference 
from the evidence ... [indicated] that Defendant did 
not know of the presence of the drug residue and 
paraphernalia." 
The critical piece missing from the State's 
presentation was evidence showing the nature and 
character of the motel, or of Defendant's room in 
particular, and the exclusivity of his control and ac-
cess.™1 The motel manager was not called as a 
witness, and when the prosecutor sought to ask one 
of the detectives about information he had learned 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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from the manager-presumably concerning such 
matters-Defendant objected and the prosecutor 
withdrew the question. Without such evidence in 
the record, the State's contentions about the exclus-
ivity of Defendant's control of and access to the 
room, at all points in time when the contraband 
might have found its way into the garbage sack, are 
speculations-albeit plausible ones-rather than infer-
ences logically drawn from the evidence actually 
before the magistrate. Cf State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 
782, 791 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (stating that, in a case 
"[w]here the State fails to present evidence estab-
lishing a pivotal fact[,] ... we must take special care 
to ensure that our review of the evidence does not 
encourage the indulging of 'inference upon infer-
ence,' or, worse, the indulging of inference upon 
assumption"), affd, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911. See 
also State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, \ 16, 3 P.3d 
725 ("While it is sometimes subtle, there is in fact a 
difference between drawing a reasonable inference 
and merely speculating about possibilities."), cert, 
denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000); id (defining 
"inference" and "speculation"). 
FN1. Indeed, one of the detectives con-
ceded the likelihood of the manager and 
the housekeeping staff having unfettered 
access to the room. 
*2 Therefore, because the evidence presented 
to the magistrate fails to support a reasonable belief 
that Defendant knowingly and intentionally pos-
sessed the methamphetamine residue and drug 
paraphernalia found in his motel room, we cannot 
say that the magistrate erred by refusing to bind 
Defendant over. 
Affirmed. 
I CONCUR: CAROLYN B. MCHUGH, Associate 
Presiding Judge. 
THORNE, Judge (dissenting): 
I respectfully dissent from the majority's af-
firmance of the magistrate's decision to not bind 
Defendant over on charges of possession of a con-
trolled substance and possession of drug 
paraphernalia. I do not agree with the majority's de-
termination that because the prosecution failed to 
present evidence showing the nature and character 
of the motel or of Defendant's lodgings and the ex-
clusivity of his control and access, the facts of this 
case fail to support a reasonable belief that Defend-
ant knowingly and intentionally possessed the 
methamphetamine residue and drug paraphernalia 
found in his motel room. See supra paras. 4-5. 
Here, the facts give rise to two reasonable al-
ternate inferences. One inference from the evidence 
would be that because Defendant gave permission 
to search the motel room, which others such as the 
manager and housekeeping staff may have had ac-
cess to, Defendant did not know of the presence of 
the drug residue and paraphernalia. However, an al-
ternative reasonable inference from other facts, 
such as the state of Defendant's motel room,FN1 
that nobody had accessed his room without his per-
mission, and that Defendant lived alone in the 
room, is that Defendant indeed knew of the drug 
residue but thought that the residue would not be 
discovered because he had properly discarded it pri-
or to leaving his room. 
FN I. The officers found the pipe where 
Defendant said it would be on Defendant's 
bed under some covers. The officers also 
found paperwork and a prescription bottle 
with Defendant's name on it. The search 
revealed nothing in the motel room belong-
ing to anyone other than Defendant. 
When faced with conflicting evidence and in-
ferences, "the magistrate must view all evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution and must 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the pro-
secution." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, H 10, 20 P.3d 
300 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further-
more, the evidence required to show probable cause 
is relatively low, see id, and the bindover standard 
is intended to leave the principal fact finding of the 
issues, which the majority identifies as the nature 
and character of the motel room and the exclusivity 
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of Defendant's control and access, to the jury. See 
State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, 1 21, 137 P.3d 787. As 
such, I disagree with the majority that the absence 
of exclusivity evidence renders any other inferences 
speculative. Although sometimes subtle, "there is in , 
fact a difference between drawing a reasonable in-
ference and merely speculating about possibilities." 
State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, ^  16, 3 P.3d 725 . 
An inference is a conclusion reached by consider-
ing other facts and deducing a logical con-
sequence from them. Stated another way, an in-
ference is a deduction as to the existence of a fact 
which human experience teaches us can reason-
ably and logically be drawn from proof of other 
facts. On the other hand, speculation is defined as 
the act or practice of theorizing about matters 
over which there is no certain knowledge. 
*3 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). It is not necessary that there be only one 
most likely inference. It is, instead, enough if an in-
ference is reasonably available which supports the 
prosecution's case. Cf. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ffi! 20-21 
(identifying two alternate inferences, an inference 
that the defendants may have been unaware the 
checks were stolen and an inference that the de-
fendants had an intent to defraud; viewing all reas-
onable inferences in a light most favorable to the 
state; and finding that despite the conflicting altern-
ate inferences the state had shown probable cause). 
The evidence in this case provides a logical basis 
from which to deduce that Defendant knowingly 
and intentionally possessed a controlled substance 
and drug paraphernalia. Accordingly, I would re-
verse the magistrate's decision. 
UtahApp.,2010. 
State v. Ramirez 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2010 WL 5452079 (Utah 
App.), 2010 UT App 373 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum B 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
^IML 
Date,., q \ ^ ] M 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY 
By 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
i • 
vs. 
PATRICK ROBERT RAMIREZ, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING BINDOVER 
AFTER PRELIMINARY HEARING 
Criminal No. 091501000 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before the Court for preliminary hearing on September 25, 2009. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, Defendant's counsel argued that Plaintiff had failed to establish probable 
cause to believe that Defendant "possessed" the methamphetamme residue or the drug paraphernalia 
found in a motel room in which he had resided and, presumably, would have been residing if he had 
not been in jail. Plaintiffs counsel argued that it was reasonable to infer that Defendant had control 
over the contraband in his motel room and that Defendant intended to exercise that control. Having 
reviewed the cases cited by Defendant's counsel and the statutory definition of "possession," as well 
as the evidence presented at the hearing, I find that the evidence fails to establish probable cause to 
believe that Defendant intended to exercise control over the drug residue and paraphernalia. 
Defendant sent the officers to the motel room to find a "clean pipe" which he thought would 
be of advantage to him with respect to other criminal charges. Defendant also gave the officers 
permission to search the room after they found the "clean pipe" where Defendant told them it would 
be. In the extended search, the officers found the drug residue and paraphernalia. Since Plaintiff 
was in jail at the time, Plaintiff would have to establish probable cause to believe that Defendant had 
. f . 
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constructive possession of the contraband. 
There is probable cause to believe that Defendant had dominion and control over the motel 
room at some point in time before the officers searched the room. There is no evidence, however, 
that Defendant had knowledge that the drug residue and paraphernalia were present in the motel 
room either when he was personally present in the room or when the officers searched the room. 
Every reasonable inference from the evidence—Defendant sent the officers to his motel room to find 
a "clean pipe" and consented to their continuing to search after they found the pipe—is that 
Defendant did not know of the presence of the drug residue and paraphernalia.' Without knowledge 
of the presence of the contraband, the Court could not infer that Defendant intended to exercise 
control over the contraband. Without evidence of an intent to exercise control, there can be no 
inference of possession of drug residue or paraphernalia. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the evidence does not establish probable cause to believe 
that Defendant committed the crimes charged against him in this case, and orders that the case be 
dismissed. 
'•• DATED this _3^Tday of September, 2009. 
(£> ^ ^i^^)c£et^ ^ 
JUDGE G. RAND BEACHAM 
]I am well-acquainted with this Defendant, having recently sentenced him to multiple 
terms of incarceration in the Utah State Prison. He purports to be familiar with police 
investigations and with his rights in those investigations. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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P R O C E E D I N G . S | 
1 (Electronically recorded on September 25, 2009) 
THE COURT: 
MR. STOUT: 
to take evidence on 
Number 5 was dismiss 
THE COURT: 
' . M R . STOUT: 
me to ask the Court 
associated with that 
THE COURT: 
MR. STOUT: 




j mtTT-' o A n n m . 
Numbers 5 and 6, Patrick Robert Ramirez. , 
He's in custody., your Honor, and we do need 
No. 5. Number 6 -- or excuse me, No. 6. 
>ed. I'm not sure why it's still tracking. 
I don't, either. 
Other than it does make it convenient for 
to waive any pay the state fees that may be 
Oh. 
Which there shouldn't be because it was 
Yeah. 
— we'll be asking that in his other cases 
Okay. Yeah. That No. 5 case, 09775, has 






case you are taking evidence? 
Yes, your Honor. • . • 
Okay. How many witnesses for that? 
I have two witnesses, your Honor. 
Two witnesses. All right. Since 
Mr. Ramirez is in custody, we'll take that one first. Let 
me see about the las t preliminary hearing. 
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(Court handles other matters) 
THE COURT: Then we are going to start with State vs. 
Patrick Robert Ramirez, case 091501000. The defendant is present 
with Mr. Stout, his Counsel. Let's have the two witnesses come 
forward and be sworn. 
COURT CLERK: Do you swear that the testimony you are 
about to give in the case now pending before the Court will be 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? 
(Witnesses indicated in the affirmative) 
THE COURT: Which one is the first witness? 
MR. GENTRY: Sergeant Benson, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Would you take the stand, 
please? 
TREVOR BENSON 
having been first duly sworn, 
testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
3Y MR. GENTRY: 
Q. Can you please state your name? 
A. Trevor Benson. 
Q. Where are you employed? 
A. Washington County Sheriff's Office. 
Q. What -- where do you work in the sheriff's office? 
A. I am assigned to corrections, booking. 
Q. In the booking? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Were you employed in booking on May 6th of 2009? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know Patrick Ramirez? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How do you know him? 
A. Just from dealing with him inside the facility. 
Q. . On May 6th, 2009 do you know whether or not he was 
incarcerated? 
A. He was. 
Q. I couldn't hear you. 
A. He was. 
Q. Do you recognize Mr. Ramirez in the courtroom today? 
A. I do. 
Q. Where is he seated? 
A. At the defense table, wearing the stripes. 
Q. Do you know if Mr. Ramirez is still incarcerated? 
A. I believe so. I saw him inside the jail yesterday. 
Q. On May 6th, 2009 were you present when the defendant was 
on a telephone from the jail? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall approximately what time of the day that 
was? 
A. I think it was the afternoon, but I'm not sure, no. 
Q. Was there something about him being on the telephone 
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What was that? 
He was being a bit 
-6- | 
loud on the phone, not loud enough 
was getting on his case for 







was looking up at me 
my suspicion. 
What did you do at 
it, but then 
over the phone and b 
as he 1 
that p 
I picked up the telephone 
















Could you hear his 
I could. 
^as doing it, 
Dint? 
receiver that 
was talking a 
conversation? 
Was there something about 
ed your attention or 
Yes. 
caused 
What specifically did you 
9 
I heard him tell a 
rieve a glass pipe be 
Did he instruct her 
Yes. . 
What did he say? 
Ke wanted her to ta 




hear him say 
to go down to 
fore the manager cou 
what to do with the 
ke it to the police. 
i? 
he went from kind 
eing real quiet, 










Id find it. 
Pips ,? 
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At that point I didn't hear a reason. I left and made a 
phone call to Eric Enter to head off the person that was going to 
pick up the pipe. 
Q. 
A. 
Why Eric Enter? 
I knew he was working that day, and he's part of the 




















Okay. Did you hear in this conversation him tell the 
where his room was? 
Yes. 
What did he say? 
The Ancestor Inn. 
Did he say a specific number? 
He did, and I had it written down that day, but I don't 
the room number. 
Okay. But he did tell you a specific number? 
Yeah. He told the female, he didn't tell me. 
No, I'm sorry, not — 
Yes . 
You overheard him tell the female? 
Yes. 
So did you then have a conversation with Detective 
Yes. 
Did you have another conversation with Mr. Ramirez then? 
I did. I left the booking area to make the phone call 
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to Detective Enter because it was very loud. There was quite a 
few people being processed in right then. So I went up front to 
a quiet office where I could pick up the telephone, as well as 
log into a computer and listen to more of the phone call that 
Mr. Ramirez was still on. 
I called Eric, and I told him what was going on. I 
pulled the phone up, and I could hear him — at that point, 
that's when I realized he was trying to get the pipe to the 
police. I didn't know that when I initially called Eric. 
Q. On that -- when you're overhearing the conversation on 
the computer, then, did he ever state a reason why he wanted it 
to -- • 
A. He was telling the female that he thought that the pipe 
was clean, and that would clear his name of whatever charges he 
was being accused of. 
Q. Did you ever talk to then Mr. Ramirez about this 
conversation? 
A. I did. After that I went to Mr. Ramirez and asked him 
if he would like to talk to someone from the task force. He told 
me yes, and I put him on the telephone with Detective Enter. 
Q. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Ramirez about a 
search of his --
A. Yes. I knew --
Q. — motel room? 
A. Detective Enter had asked if I have — if I would have 
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Mr. Ramirez call because they wanted to search the motel room. 
When I told Mr. Ramirez that, he said, "Absolutely. Let me talk 
to him. I'll tell him right where it's at." 
Q.- Then at that point you had handed the phone to 
Mr. Ramirez? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So did you call Detective Enter? 
A. I did. 
Q. Okay. And then handed the phone — 
A. Yes. 
Q. So did you have any more to do with it after that point? 
A. Just stood by while he talked on the phone, and then I 
escorted him back to the cell that he was housed in. 
MR. GENTRY: I don't have any other questions, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. You may cross examine. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. STOUT: 
Q. Did you make a report regarding this? 
A. I didn't. I thought that I did, and when this subpoena 
came up I searched for one and was not able to locate one. I'm 
not sure why. 
Q. Which would explain why I don't have a copy. 
A. Yes. I don't know why there's not one. 
Q. Okay. When you picked up the phone to hear what you've 
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ied to as Mr. Ramirez, were there other inmates on the 
— other lines or other — I don't know how it's set up 
I assume there's more than one phone. 
There are two phones. They sit just a few feet from 





Okay. When you picked up the listening in line --
Uh-huh. 




Yes. You punch a code in for each phone. 
Okay. To your recollection, do you remember punching in 







That Mr. B.amirez was using? 
Yes, and I could see him talking while I was listening 
MR. STOUT: I don't have any further questions, your 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. GENTRY: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Go ahead and step down. 
, MR. GENTRY: I call Detective Eric Enter, your Honor. 
ERIC ENTER 
having been first duly sworn, 
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testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GENTRY: 
Q. Detective/ will you please state your name?' 
A. Eric Enter. 
Q. Where are you employed? 
A. At the Washington County Sheriff's Office assigned to 
the Washington County Drug Task Force. 
Q. All right. Were you so employed on May 6th of this year? 
A. I was. 
Q.. On that day did you receive a phone call from Sergeant 
Trevor Benson? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Okay. What -- when you were talking on the phone with 
Sergeant Benson, then at some point did he hand the phone to. 
somebody else? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who was that? 
A. It was Patrick Ramirez. 
Q. Did he identify himself as Mr. Ramirez? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. You had a conversation, then, with Mr. Ramirez? 
A. I did. 
Q. Okay. Do you recall what he told you when he first --
when you first got on the phone? 
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1 A. When I first talked with him he wanted — he wanted 
2 somebody from the task force — he kept mentioning Lieutenant • 
3 Staheli's name. He's the commander of the task force. He wanted 
4 us. to go in and find a pipe -- an unused pipe that was in his 
5 motel room that would help clear his name on another charge that 
6 he was currently incarcerated on. 
7 J Q. Did you ask him for consent to search the room? 
8 A. I did. I asked him for consent several times. The 
9 first time I wasn't actually on the phone with him. I was on the 
10 phone with Sergeant Benson, and I asked Sergeant Benson to ask 
11 Patrick Ramirez if he would give us consent to search the room. • 
12 He told Sergeant Benson yes. At that point Sergeant Benson 
13 handed the phone to Patrick Ramirez, and then thatrs when I 
14 started talking to him. 
15 Q. Did you have occasion during this conversation to ask 
16 Mr. Ramirez directly for consent? 
17 A. I did, on at least two occasions. 
13 Q. What was his respon.se? 
19 A. He said yes. He wanted us to go in and get this pipe . 
20 to clear his name, and he was concerned that the pipe get to 
21 Lieutenant Staheli to prove that he was innocent on some other 
22 charges. 
23 Q. How long did you talk to Mr. Ramirez? 
24 A. Probably 15, 20 minutes, at least. 
25 Q. Okay. During that conversation did he tell you where he 
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What did he tell you? 
He indicated he — his room was at the Ancestor Inn, and 
room 224. 
Did you go to that location? 
' I did. 




Yes. Patrick Ramirez was on the phone with me the 
time that — from the start when I left the office to when 




Did you go to Ancestor Inn? 
Yes. We went to room 224. We met with the manager who 
the door for us. Patrick had given consent to me and to 
Sergeant Benson up to that point. We entered. He described to 
1 me where, this pipe would be. He said it would be on his bed 








Was it there? 
It was. 
Describe what you found. 
It was a clear glass pipe, the type commonly used to 
controlled substances, and it did not appear to be used. 
Did you inform Mr. Ramirez that you had found the pipe? 
Yes, I did. 
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Q. Okay. Did you ever indicate to him an intention to 
continue to search his room? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was his response to that? 
A. I told -- I asked him if we could search the rest of the 
room and he said, "Yeah, go ahead. There won't be anything 
there." 
Q. Did you continue to search? 
A. Yes. Other detectives that were in the room as well, 
Detective Miles and Detective Mitchell, both continued to search. 
Q. Was anything else found suspicious? 
A. Yes. Detective Miles located a corner of a plastic bag 
in a trash — or a trash bag that was hanging on something from 
the kitchen, and he went through the trash and found this corner 
of a baggie. It appeared to have some residue on it. 
Q. Okay. Anything else found? 
A. There was a plastic -- a short piece of plastic straw 
commonly referred to as a tube straw, and that was in the same 
area, I believe. 
Q. Did Mr. Ramirez ever speak to someone else on the phone 
while you were there? 
A. Yes. Mr. Ramirez is familiar with Detective Mitchell, 
and he overheard — he heard him in the background talking and he 
asked if that was Detective Mitchell. I told him it was, and he 
asked that he might be able to talk to him. 
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Okay. Did he talk to Detective Mitchell? 
Yes, he did. 
Okay. Could you overhear that conversation? 
A lot of. it, yes. 
-15-
Q. How were you able to overhear that? 
A. I believe Detective Mitchell had the volume turned up 
or the speaker phone portion activated so I could hear it coming 
from the phone. 
Q. All right. What was the substance of that conversation 
that you heard? 
A. He proceeded to tell Detective Mitchell the same 
thing that he was telling me, that he wanted the pipe turned 
in to prove his innocence on that — the same case that he was 
incarcerated on. Then he — Detective Mitchell asked him -- if 
I can just refresh my memory real quick. Okay. 
He explained to Detective Mitchell the circumstances 
of his arrest that he was incarcerated on, told him that the 
gentleman that he was with had purchased two pipes and given one • 
to him. When the driver of the vehicle that he was in — the 
other gentleman -- was pulled over, from what I understand the 
driver handed Patrick the used pipe, and he stuck it underneath 
his seat.. He was subsequently charged with that pipe, but he 
wanted the clean pipe that was actually his given to -- into 
evidence to prove his innocence in that case. 
Q. All right. While -you overheard the conversation between 
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Mr. Ramirez and Detective Mitchell, did the defendant say 
anything regarding his own drug use? 
A. Yes. Detective Mitchell asked him why he had the unused 
pipe in the first place. I could hear Mr. Ramirez say, "Why do I 
have it? Why do I have it? I'm going to be honest with you, 
Mike. I have a problem." 
Q. Okay. Did he say anything else? 
A. He went on to say that he had a rig, which is a 
street term for syringe, and he said that it was clean and 
unused, but he did admit that he -- he -- I heard him say, "ram 
it." Detective Mitchell and I hadn't heard that term, so he 
clarified with him what ramming it meant, and asked him if he 
meant slamming it, which is injecting it. Mr. Ramirez indicated 
that yes, he slammed it. 
Q. Did you find a hypodermic needle — or a syringe? 
A. It wasn't in the room. It was — he indicated that it 
was with him when he was arrested, I think. We didn't have --
we don't have a syringe that was booked into evidence, no* 
Q. Okay. So the items that were taken into evidence, do 
you know if a field test was done on any of those items? 
A. Yes. There's a report here in the file. It shows 
that Detective Mitchell, who is FIDO certified, which is a 
field investigator — it's a drug kit, a test kit. The report 
indicates that he tested item MMl, which is the baggie with the 
suspected residue, and MM3, which is the tube straw. 
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Q, You said you had some paperwork related to that? 
A. Yes. There is a field drug test report, and a FIDO 
controlled substance note sheet. 
Q. Explain those papers, then. So when you do a field 
test, are these papers filled out? 
A. Yes, every time. 
Q. Is there a case number associated with those papers? 
A. Yes, there is. 
Q. Is the case number the same case that we've been 
discussing here today? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. All right. Describe, then, a FIDO test and how it 
works. 
A. The -- well, describe how he might test the baggie. 
Each of us has our own kit, and once we're certified we're given 
a kit by the State' of Utah Forensics Lab. A sample is taken from 
whatever item we're testing. There's a testing dish with several 
different testing cups, I guess you could say. One of them is 
left blank. .. 
One of them is a known positive test substance is 
put into that one, and that's included in every kit. It's a 
substance that the forensics lab supplies that — it tests the 
chemicals that we're using to make sure that they're working 
properly. Then a sample from the item that we're testing is put 
in a separate cup. 
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1 I The chemical is put in the blank to make sure that the 
Z | chemical itself is not contaminated. No colors were indicated on 
3 that. On the known substance, the chemical is put into that, and 
4 you look for the positive, which is blue. Then the chemical is 
5 put on the test sample itself. 
6 Q. So to the best of your knowledge, was this particular 
7 I test you've just described done on that — on item MM1? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Who performed that test? 
10 A. Detective Mike Mitchell. 
11 Q. So is that document you referred to, does that contain 
12 the steps on how to do the test? How does that work? 
13 A. It's -- the field drug test report shows the results, 
14 certification, and is checked that he has successfully completed 
15 the training and is certified. It has his certification number 
16 and also certifies that he followed the proper testing procedure 
17 I in this case. 
18 i Q. Is there a result ^iven on those tests? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. What does it say? 
21 A. It's indicated that it presentively contains 
22 methamphetamine. 
23 MR. GENTRY: Your Honor, I think I'd like to have those 
24 marked, actually. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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confers with court clerk) 
On those — I'm sorry. 
Do you need this? 
If I could just have them. 
BY MR. GENTRY: On those documents, do you see 









Is there a signature from 
On field drug test report there 





















is Mike Mitchell's 
Your Honor, I would ask that it be 
Any objection to those twc 
Not for today's purposes, 





(Exhibit Nos, 1 and 2 received into evidence) 
BY MR. GENTRY: On the documents that 





t have them in front of me 
Can I — I'm sorry, your 
ed those questions --
we just admitted | 
anything else 
I believe 
Honor. I should 
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- it's MM3, which is the --
Okay. Both of these items 
in the hotel 

































that hotel room? Did you meet anyone? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know who was registered to that hotel room? 
A. I remember one of the other detectives meeting with 
the manager, and -- who indicated the room was --. had been rented 
by --
MR. STOUT: Your Honor, I'm going to object to what the 
manager may have said. 
MR. GENTRY: And that's fine. I understand. 
THE COURT: That would be hearsay. 
Q. BY MR. GENTRY: Okay. But as you were -searching — the 
entire team was searching, did anyone come in or out of that 
hotel room? 
A. No. We did locate some paperwork that did have Patrick 
Ramirez's name on it and photographed those. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-21-
Q. Okay. Inside the hotel room? 
A. Inside the hotel room. 
MR. GENTRY: I don't have any other questions, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. You may cross examine. 
MR. STOUT: Thank you. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. STOUT: 
Q. When you initially spoke with Mr. Ramirez — again, this 
was by telephone, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that's because he was incarcerated in Purgatory 
Correctional Facility? 
A. Correct. 
Q. He wasn't able -- he wasn't being released, correct? 
A. No. 
Q. He had been or was either booked in or in the process of 
being booked in, correct? 
A. He -- it's my understanding he was already booked in. 
Q. When you initially spoke to him, he indicated that he 
wanted you to go to this hotel room to retrieve a pipe, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Initially did he indicate to you that he wanted you to 
search the room or just to get the pipe? 
A. He mostly just wanted us to go get the pipe. But like I 
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said, I asked him several times — clarified that it was okay if 
we checked the rest of the room and searched it. 
Q. But initially his request was just go get the pipe? 
A. Correct. 





















d, you asked him for permission to search, correct? 
Correct. 
Okay. Before you asked for permission to search, had 
sed him of his Miranda rights? 
No,- I did not. 
Before -- was it you that asked him questions about, 
you have a pipe," or was that the other — 
It was the other detective. 
The other detective. Before he asked those questions, 
dvise him of Miranda rights? 
No. 
You would agree he was in custody at the time, correct? 
Yes. 
Again, you met -- you personally met with the manager of 
el? 
Yes. 
Motel. So he had access to that room, correct? 
The manager would, of course, yes. 
Okay. This room — was the door to the exterior or 
of this motel? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-23-
A. How do you mean? 
Q. Well, to get inside the room. . Do you know what I mean? 
A. It — both, I guess. It's in a walkway, a covered 
walkway, but it's not inside the building, no. It's — 
Q. To your knowledge, the door wasn't open. You — 
A. It was not open. 
Q. You couldn't open it without a key? 
A. What — I'm sorry? 
Q. . It couldn't be opened without a key? 
A. No. 
Q. To the best of your knowledge, other individuals 
had access to that room, including maid staff and -- or 
housecleaning, I should say. 
A. I would imagine so. 
Q. You indicated you found some paperwork that belonged to 
Mr. Ramirez. You didn't find any other belongings to somebody 
that indicated anything else belonged to other individuals in 
that room? 
A. No. They were the only two items that we found with a 
name on it. One was a piece of paper, and one was a prescription 
bottle with Mr. Ramirez's name on it. 
Q. He was pretty clear to you that he didn't mind you 
searching the room because, to his knowledge, based on what 
he told you, there wouldn't be anything there, right? 
A. That's what he claimed, yes. 
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1 Q. Okay. Would it be safe to assume in your opinion that 
2 he wouldn't give you that consent if he knew there was something 
3 in there that would get him in trouble? 
4 A. A reasonable person probably wouldn't — I don't know. 
5 I can't say — speak on his behalf. 
6 Q. Okay. But he wasn't telling you, ''There's drugs in this 
7 j room. Go find my drugs"? 
8 A. Right. . 
9 Q. He-was telling you, uGo find this pipe that doesn't have 
10 . anything in it," correct? 
11 A. Correct. 
12 Q. Did he say anything after you indicated you found 
13 controlled substances? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Or had you already discontinued the phone --
16 A. We didn't disclose to him that we had found anything 
17 other than the pipe that he wanted us to retrieve. 
18 Q. And knowing Mr. Ramirez, I imagine he was pretty excited 
19 that you found the pipe? 
20 A. Yes. He at several times wanted to make sure that I got 
21 that put into evidence to clear his name, and that I wouldn't 
22 screw him, his words. 
23 Q. Okay. These are one of those dumb lawyer questions, but 
24 from where Mr. Ramirez was in jail, he couldn't access this hotel 
25 room, correct? 
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1 A. Not when I was on the phone with him, no. 
2 Q. Because he didn't have a key to the hotel? 
3 A. I don't know if he had a key. It would have been put in 
4 his property, so he wouldn't have it on his person, no. 
5 Q. And obviously he couldn't get out of the jail? 
6 A. Correct. 
7 MR. STOUT: If I can have just a quick moment. 
8 Q. BY MR. STOUT: Did Mr. Ramirez make any statements to 
9 you that would show that he had knowledge of the controlled 
10 substances or the paraphernalia that you found, other than his 
11 clean pipe? 
12 A. No, I did not question him about what we had found. 
13 Q. You didn't question — but he had -- he didn't say 
14 anything, either. 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. He didn't give you any --
17 A. No. The only comment he made was that there wouldn't be 
18 anything in the room. ' 
19 Q. Okay. So based on that — 
20 A. Except for the clean pipe. 
21 Q. -- it's fair to assume that he didn't think there was 
22 anything in the room to get him in trouble? 
23 A. That's what he indicated to me, yes. 
24 Q. That's what he told you? 
25 A. Yes. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 





























. -26- | 
He didn't make any incriminating statements about 
illegal in that — • • 
No. 
MR. STOUT: — that you found. No further questions. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 
MR. GENTRY: No, ' your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. You may step down. Any other 
state witness? 
MR. GENTRY: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any defense evidence? 
MR. STOUT: No evidence, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Any argument on the evidence anc 
these two charges? 
MR. GENTRY: Yes, your Honor, just very quickly. I 
think the evidence is pretty clear. The officers went to the 
defendant's hotel room at his request. He -- they went in at 
his request. They searched with his consent. They found 
incriminating evidence, part of which he instructed them to 
find. The items 'were tested -- field tested and positive for 
methamphetamine. . 
Just anticipating what Counsel may argue, the defendant 
certainly wasn't there at the time, so it isn't the traditional 
finding in a pocket or on a person's person kind of possession, 
but possession, according to the code, means joint of individual 
ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, 
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maintaining. It's a very broad definition. 
Items in the hotel room, the only evidence before the 
Court is that they were in the defendant's possession, or the 
inference is they were in his possession at one point when he 
was in that hotel room. 
He knew where the pipe was. It was located exactly 
where he said. The inference is that everything in that hotel 
room — the rest of the paraphernalia in that hotel room, 
including the methamphetamine, also belonged to him. 
Just because he wasn't in physical possession of it at • 
the time that the officers went there because he was in jail 
doesn't mean that it wasn't his stuff, his paraphernalia and his 
methamphetamine. 
So your Honor, the State would argue that he was --
he's guilty of use or possession of that, according to definition 
of possession under the statute. It doesn't require physical 
possession. It only requires that there be some connection to 
the defendant. He maintained it. It belonged to him. He had 
ownership of it, something along those lines. 
Also in the definition it says that you can find the 
possession if the controlled substance is found in a place or 
under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability 
and the intent to exercise dominion or control over it. I think 
in this case those circumstances are present, would ask the Court . 
to bind the defendant over. 
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ownership, they're charged with possession. 
It's obviously a constructive possession case, and 
the case law in Utah is pretty clear that in order, as a matter 
of law, to have constructive possession there needs to be a 
sufficient nexus between the defendant and the item to permit a 
factual inference of two things. One, the defendant had the 
power to exercise control over the item, and No. 2, intent. 
It's a highly fact specific area, constructive 
possession, and there's two cases that I believe are on point. 
The first — the one I'm reading from -- it's actually a juvenile 
case. The cite is 198 P.3d 1007, the M.B. case is what it says. 
It explains again that, "Knowledge and ability to possess do not 
equal possession where there is no evidence of intent to make use 
of that." Some of the things that -- and again, it points out 
that it's a highly fact sensitive determination. 
The specific factors that the Court points to is 
whether there was incriminating statements made by the defendant, 
which in this case there weren't, at least on the controlled 
substances. He's obviously claimed ownership of the pipe that 
was clean. So I guess the Court could find an inference for the 
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paraphernalia, but there wasn't any controlled substance 
(inaudible). 
Another issue is it points to suspicious or 
incriminating behavior, sale of drugs, use of drugs, proximity of 
defendant to location of the drugs, drugs in plain view and drugs 
on defendant's person. The Court refers to a case by the name of 
Salas, which indicates that — again, speaking of constructive 
possession that speaking of ownership vehicle indicating that 
where the defendant owned the vehicle, but because others had 
access to the vehicle, that that was not sufficient to blame the 
owner of the vehicle for what was found inside of it. 
Additionally, the Court pointed out in that case, in 
the Salas case, the defendant's spontaneous statements and 
actions indicated he had not previously known about the drugs. 
My argument in this case, your Honor, is that this is a similar 
case that there wasn't any statements or actions from my client 
that would indicate that he knew there were drugs there. I don't 
think even Mr. Ramirez is going to tell the officers, "Go to this 
motel room where there are drugs and charge me with them." 
Obviously he was -- his intent was exactly the 
opposite as was stated, and that he didn't make any incriminating 
statements or have any knowledge that's been taken into evidence 
today that he knew those items were there. 
There is some other case law that goes more to the 
State's favor — State vs. Fox. It's a 1985 case. The cite for 
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1 that is 709 P.2d 316. I'll let the Court take a look at that if 
2 | that's important for the Court to look at. Again, it's highly 
3 fact sensitive where there needs to be the nexus. There has to 
4 be nexus between the intent and the ability to possess. 
5 In this case, your Honor, my client was locked in jail 
6 and had no ability to possess those. There's not been evidence 
7 I today to even indicate that that - was his room. Now obviously 
8 they went purportedly where he said to go and found a clean item 
9 that he said was his, but there's nothing tying intent or 
10 physical ability of Mr. Ramirez, especially at the time they 
11 found this, to the items that were illegal that they found. 
12 So I would ask the Court to dismiss as a matter of law 
13 Count I, the possession of a controlled substance, because they 
14 simply don't have an essential element of that, which is 
15 possession, constructive or otherwise. 
16 THE COURT: What about Count II? 
17 MR. STOUT: Count II, your Honor, a clean pipe, I mean 
18 we can.always make the argument that it's -- unless there's 
19 something to make it paraphernalia, it needs -- it's just a glass 
2 0 pipe. You can purchase those. We didn't hear it was something 
21 that had been converted. It was just a glass pipe that you could 
22 buy in a tobacco shop. 
23 Obviously there were incriminating items found nearby, 
24 at least in the same room, but again, I don't think there's 
25 anything tying that to my> client. To the pipe, yes. I would — 
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I'll just leave that to the Court. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Gentry? 
MR. GENTRY: Your Honor, just a couple of things. First 
of.all, there is evidence that it's his room. First of all, he 
said it was his room. He brought the officers there himself. 
The item inside — the pipe — is located right where he said it 
would be, and there were other items located in the room with his 
name on it. So I think there is a very strong evidence --
there's very strong evidence there that this is his room. Plus 
the manager let t h e m — let him in — let the officers into that 
room when they expressed a desire to visit Mr. Ramirez's room. 
So I think the only evidence before the Court is that this is his 
room. 
Also, your Honor, I think -- I guess if you take 
Counsel's argument to its extreme, any time an officer pulls 
someone out of a car and puts them in handcuffs he no longer has 
power to possess anything in that vehicle, so anything they find 
in that vehicle can't be chargeable to that person because they 
no longer have power to exercise control over that. 
I think that's a too narrow view of what it means to 
possess something, according to the statute, according to the 
definition of possession. You can't look at it just on that one 
moment of time. The fact is, he possessed these items. Just 
because they're not on his physical person when he's at the jail 
doesn't mean he hasn't — doesn't possess them according to the 
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statute. Again, possession or use means the joint or individual 
ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, or 
maintaining. It's a very broad definition. 
With regard to intent, your Honor, there are 
incriminating statements. His whole statement that he wanted him 
to go get the clean pipe to prove that he was clean, that's an 
incriminating statement. That's para — that's drug 
paraphernalia. He's expressing his own --
THE COURT: Are you sure? 
MR. GENTRY: What's that? 
THE COURT: A clean pipe is drug paraphernalia? 
MR. GENTRY: Well, I mean according to the officers, 
it was a pipe to ingest some — I think it's incriminating as to 
his state of mind, particularly when you combine with his other 
statements that he had a problem, that he preferred to slam his 
drugs, which the officer meant to inject it. Those are 
incriminating statements that he had intent, at least intent 
to use drugs. 
THE COURT: Well, I think the closest argument you've 
got there is that according to the testimony, Mr. Ramirez wanted 
this pipe to be found and turned in to demonstrate that he did 
not have a connection with drugs, which would imply that this 
pipe might otherwise be thought to have connection to drugs. But 
I don't know that just the fact that there's a clean pipe means 
that it's a drug pipe any more than it means it's a bubble pipe 
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or a tobacco pipe. 
MR. GENTRY: Well, that could be the case, your Honor. 
But I think taken on a whole, he calls the drug task force to 
tell them to go look for this pipe that was clean to prove that 
he's innocent of drug use. They go to the room. They find other 
paraphernalia indicative of drug use. You combine that with his 
statement that he had a problem, he wanted to be hon — "Why did 
I have a pipe? Well, to be honest, I have a problem," and that 
he preferred -- they would also find a rig — the syringe — and 
that he preferred to slam it. I think when you take that all 
together, it shows that he does have intent to possess drugs, in 
my mind. 
THE COURT: True. That may go that far. I don't know 
what it says about the pipe, though, the use of the pipe itself. 
But go ahead. I understand what your theory is. But how do we 
get to knowledge and ability — or get past simple knowledge and 
ability. We don't have evidence that Mr. Ramirez knew the drugs 
were there, the baggie with the residue. 
MR. GENTRY: No. Well, your Honor, I think -- what 
I think the inferences are in this case that this is his room, 
there is no evidence anybody else has been in the room. I think 
we can infer that he would know what was in his room. 
THE COURT: Well, I guess. I mean that's a general 
inference. We can infer I know what's in my basement. It 
doesn't make it true, but we can infer that I know what's in my 
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basement, 
In this circumstance, I think it's a stronger inference 
he didn't know the drugs were there, or he wouldn't have sent 
police officers to that place to look around. But we're not 
talking about which is the strongest inference. I understand 
that, but I don't think that's a very strong inference that he 
knew the drugs were there; therefore, he sent police officers to 
go look for something else and gave them permission to search the 
rest of the room. That doesn't sound like a person who knew that 
the drugs were there. 
MR. GENTRY: Your Honor, I don't pretend to know why he 
did this or — 
THE COURT: Well — 
MR. GENTRY: — what's going on in his head. I don't 
pretend to know any of that, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. GENTRY: It's a very strange circumstance, I admit. 
THE COURT: Well, to some degree you do have to at least 
show me some intent, something going on in Mr. Ramirez's head, 
some evidence of what was going on there. 
MR. GENTRY: Well, I think I have to show intent to 
possess, your Honor -- intent to possess. I think his only 
statements --
THE COURT: Right, and how is your evidence of intent — 
Mr. Ramirez's intent to possess those drugs -- that residue in 
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that baggie -- any stronger than it would be against the motel 
manager who had equal access to the room? 
MR. GENTRY: I think his own statements, he's admission 
he had a problem, the fact that he went there for the — 
THE COURT: He didn't really even say what his problem 
was, though. I mean again, that's something that has. to be 
inferred from the context 
MR. GENTRY: That's true. 
THE COURT: We're getting inferences piled on 
inferences, and I'm just not sure they really string out that 
well.. That's the problem. I mean I have to read the evidence 
all in the light most favorable to the State's case. I also 
have to determine whether this is an improvident prosecution 
(inaudible) to the appellate court that wrote it. 
MR. GENTRY: Well, the evidence is what it is, your 
Honor. I --
THE COURT: Yeah. So you say possession by Mr. Ramirez 
is shown by his ability to control, at least he claimed it was 
his room, he told them what was in the room and -where to find 
it. He had access to the room. Clearly it was his room so he 
could --
MR. GENTRY: Certainly. 
THE COURT: — at least possess it at some point. Weil, 
what do you say shows his intent to possess the drug residue in 
that baggie? Just that it was in the room? 
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1 I. MR. GENTRY: I don't have any more than that, your 
2 Honor. I mean I think you can infer that he has intent to 
3 possess what's in his own room as much as you can infer that 
4 anybody has an intent to possess what's in their room. 
5 THE COURT: Well, then you would have to infer the 
6 intent to possess the bed and the t.v. and take them with him 
7 ! when he checked out — 
8 MR. GENTRY: Weil — 
9 THE COURT: — because they're in the room, too. 
10 MR. GENTRY: Okay. 
11 THE COURT: I mean again — and which is the strongest 
12 inference is not necessarily part of this decision, but I have to 
13 pay at least some attention to how — 
14 MR. GENTRY: Except your Honor, that -- I mean that --
15 THE COURT: — the likelihood (inaudible) this evidence 
16 could stack up. 
17 MR. GENTRY: Except I mean a bed and a t.v. belongs in 
18 the room. Methamphetamine does not belong in the room, and you 
19. don't typically go into a motel room and find methamphetamine 
20 on — hanging on a garbage bag on the door, so — 
21 THE COURT: I don't — I'm making Mr.. Stout's arguments 
22 for him, but I don't know that --
23 MR. STOUT: You're doing (inaudible). 
24 THE COURT: I don't know that the law says 
25 methamphetamine is intended to be found in the room or any place 
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else. It's intended not to be found anywhere because it's 
illegal. It's not the same. The intent to possess and control a 
particular item is what we're looking for here. The inferences 
upon inferences that we have to get to to find a string to 
connect that to Mr. Ramirez is kind of thin. Is there evidence 
that you haven't given today, evidence — I guess other officers 
could be called who are involved. 
MR. GENTRY: Detective Mitchell, who couldn't be here 
today, would have basically said what you heard today. 
THE COURT: Yeah. All right. Mr. Stout, anything else? 
MR. STOUT: Your Honor, I would add briefly that again, 
it's the nexus, the finding a pipe and then him admitting that he 
has a problem. I (inaudible) don't -- you know, that's not 
illegal yet, but --
THE COURT: Well, there was a context, though. Of 
course, they were talking about, "Why did you want a pipe?" 
He said, "I have a problem," and they were -- it was the drug 
task force he was talking to. There's sort of the context --
MR. STOUT: There are some, and I — I mean I agree, 
your Honor, with your previous statements. I think it is a 
stretch. Him saying that he likes to slam it versus — and 
finding a pipe, those are — you know, you don't use a pipe to 
slam. You use needles, so with that, your Honor, again, I 
think — one other thing — one other argument is that based on 
the conversation with Mr. Ramirez, they found the pipe where he 
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said it would be. There hasn't been any statements, to my 
recollection, that he was actually there, just that he knew where 
that pipe was. They found the pipe where he said it was. That 
doesn't put him in that room. 
I can tell you where my wife's parents keep their 
lawnmower in Iowa, but I've never been there. So if someone were 
to go look for something where I said, "Go find this," they'll 
find it. That doesn't put me there. 
THE COURT: But Mr. Ramirez saying the purpose for which 






Yeah, the pipe. 
The clean pipe, yes. 
Yeah. 
MR. STOUT: Again, they could — he — for all we know, 
someone put it there. That's a stretch, too, someone else 
besides my client. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. STOUT: We know other people had access to the room. 
Obviously the manager did. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. STOUT: That's all I wish to add on that. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, this is one of the 
thinnest cases for a probable cause finding I've seen for awhile, 
and you know, the evidence we have to take what evidence there 
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is. The finding of a baggie and a tube straw with residue 
testing positive for methamphetamine, according to the field 
tests done, is sufficient to raise an inference that certainly 
that those things were in the room is sufficient evidence to more 
than infer that the room was that of Mr. Ramirez, meaning that he 
was the responsible person. He had the right to occupy the room. 
His description of where to find another item in the room was --
at least raises an inference that he had been there and knew 
where things were. It may not be the best inference or the only 
one, but at least does raise an inference. 
Whether he had the intent to exercise control or 
possession or ownership of the baggie and the tube straw requires 
one of the slimmest inferences I can imagine, and that is that 
baggies with methamphetamine residue and tube straw are not 
normally supplied with motels, and so that distinguishes them 
from the bed and the t.v., and puts them more in the category of 
things that a tenant of a motel room either brings with him and 
leaves there or discovers in the room and leaves there, but it's 
not the kind of thing that is provided to tenants of rooms. 
I don't know. I really have a hard time stretching the 
evidence to the point of possession by Mr. Ramirez. Let's see, 
where did I — oh. What were those cases you were talking about, 
Mr. Stout? What were the names of them? There was a juvenile 
case. 
MR. STOUT: The juvenile case is — and the reason I 
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1 didn't say the name is because I'm going to embarrass myself. 
2 State exrel, e-x-r-e-1, M.B. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. STOUT: The cite i s — well, there's two cites. 
5 The Utah Court of Appeals, 2008 UT at 433, or 198 P.3d 1007. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. Was that the only one you had 
7 ! referred me to? I thought. I wrote down — 
8 MR. STOUT: I referred you to two others, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MR. STOUT: The one that I mentioned in all fairness, 
11 as I believe it's my duty, it's a little more favorable to the 
12 State. It's State vs. Fox. 
13 • THE COURT: Oh, the Fox case. 
14 MR. STOUT: It's 709 P.2d 316, Utah 1985. Then there's 
15 a Salas case, S-a-1-a-s. State vs. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386. 
16 THE COURT: Now both of those should have been referred 
17 to in the 2008 case. 
18 MR. STOUT: And that's correct. I'm just looking at the 
19 (inaudible). That's correct. They are. 
20 THE COURT: I'm going to read that 2008 case first. 
21 I want to see what the current state of thinking is in the 
22 J appellate courts about inferences of possession. So I'll need 
23 to take a look at that. If there's time today, great, and if not 
24 I'll have to just do it and get back.to both Counsel on that. 
25 I think I'd like to conclude the hearing and give back 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-41-
1 the exhibits at this point, but I want to take a look at that one 
2 issue first. Okay. That's all for today on that. 
3 MR. STOUT: Your Honor, Mr. Ramirez has asked me to 
4 again ask the Court to waive any pay the state fees that he's 
5 incurring. He's a state inmate being housed here between all his 
6 other different cases. I'd ask the Court for every case they can 
7 I to waive the pay the state fees. 
'8 THE COURT: Yeah. Asking Mr. Ramirez to pay would be 
9 like asking me to dance ballet. It's just not going to happen. 
10 So — seriously. So I will order that his pay the state fees are 
11 waived. 
12 MR. STOUT: Retroactively for everything, is that — 
13 because I think as of now his bill is about $6,000. Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: Yeah. 
15 MR. STOUT: With the continuation of that, your Honor, 
16 may I be excused, or — 
17 . THE COURT: Yes. 
18 MR. STOUT: — do you want me to stick around for — 
19 THE COURT: No. No. I'll take a look at it. It's not 
20 looking good for today, but (inaudible). 
21 MR. STOUT: Okay. Thank you. 
22 (Hearing concluded) 
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Addendum D 
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2009). Prohibited acts - Penalties 
(2) Prohibited acts B-Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance 
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or 
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional 
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2 (West Supp. 2009). Definitions 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(ii) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, control, 
occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, inhalation, 
swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from distribution, of 
controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group possession or use of 
controlled substances. For a person to be a possessor or user of a controlled substance, 
it is not required that the person be shown to have individually possessed, used, or 
controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly 
participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of any 
substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring, or the controlled substance 
is found in a place or under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability 
and the intent to exercise dominion and control over it. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West Supp. 2009). Unlawful Acts 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, 
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, 
inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human 
body in violation of this chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty7 of 
a class B misdemeanor. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-3. "Drug paraphernalia" defined 
As used in this chapter, "drug paraphernalia" means any equipment, product, or 
material used, or intended for use, to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, package, repackage, store, 
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or to otherwise introduce a controlled substance into 
the human body in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, and 
includes, but is not limited to: 
(1) kits used, or intended for use, in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, or 
harvesting any species of plant which is a controlled substance or from which a 
controlled substance can be derived; 
(2) kits used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, converting, 
producing, processing, or preparing a controlled substance; 
(3) isomerization devices used, or intended for use, to increase the potency of any 
species of plant which is a controlled substance; 
(4) testing equipment used, or intended for use, to identify or to analyze the strength, 
effectiveness, or purity of a controlled substance; 
(5) scales and balances used, or intended for use, in weighing or measuring a 
controlled substance; 
(6) diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydrochloride, mannitol, mannited, 
dextrose and lactose, used, or intended for use to cut a controlled substance; 
(7) separation gins and sifters used, or intended for use to remove twigs, seeds, or 
other impurities from marihuana; 
(8) blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing devices used, or intended for use 
to compound a controlled substance; 
(9) capsules, balloons, envelopes, and other containers used, or intended for use to 
package small quantities of a controlled substance; 
(10) containers and other objects used, or intended for use to store or conceal a 
controlled substance; 
(11) hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, or intended for use to 
parenterally inject a controlled substance into the human body; and 
(12) objects used, or intended for use to ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a 
controlled substance into the human body, including but not limited to : 
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